[OSM-dev] GDPR implementation on planet.osm.org

Michał Brzozowski www.haxor at gmail.com
Wed Jun 20 10:11:28 UTC 2018

If OSM metadata is believed by OSMF to be personal data, so should be
photos added to Wikimedia Commons with a geotag. If anything, it's a
stronger proof that the user was there. I wonder what their legal team
thinks of it.

śr., 20 cze 2018, 11:41 użytkownik Jochen Topf <jochen at remote.org> napisał:

> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 09:03:01AM +0200, Frederik Ramm wrote:
> > > All of
> > > this needs to be tied in the OAuth stuff and it has to be done in a way
> > > that 3rd party services using OSM data can ask *their* downstream users
> > > to identify in the same way which allows OSM to track everybody who
> uses
> > > the full OSM data everywhere adding more personal data to keep and to
> > > explain to users and get permissions from users for.
> >
> > No, there's a mistake in your reasoning here.
> >
> > It is true that downstream data distributors like Overpass or the
> > Geofabrik downloads need to be able to verify whether someone has an OSM
> > account or not. Pascal has been doing that for ages on his HDYC site,
> > for example.
> >
> > But downstream data distibutors do not need to know or store anything
> > more than that; the Geofabrik download server for example will not even
> > store the user name of the person who has logged in, just that "whoever
> > is here has just proven they have an OSM account". So the downstream
> > distributor can deal with this without processing any personal data. (It
> > would be possible to extend our OAuth system by a call that would not
> > even return the user's identity to the caller - currently the identity
> > is returned to the caller and the caller must then decide whether to
> > process it or not.)
> It doesn't matter if you store the user name or not. If you ask somebody
> to enter personal information, you have to tell them them what this is
> for. The user doesn't understand how OAuth works or how it is
> configured, so for them both the downstream site and OSMF get the
> personal information, so you have to explain to the user what's
> happening, even if you don't store the data for more than the few
> milliseconds it needs to authenticate them. And the downstream site has
> to make the user aware of any restrictions, too.
> And chances are all of this will end up in some logfiles unless
> everybody makes sure it doesn't.
> And if you actually want to make sure that redacted data (because the
> user wanted it to be deleted) is deleted downstream also, you have to
> know who you gave this data to and inform them or find some other way
> of informing them.
> > > Please stop this nonsense now!
> >
> > Given these alternatives, I think the course currently followed by the
> > OSMF is the least disruptive.
> It might be "the least disruptive", but if it doesn't make any sense,
> that doesn't make it better. Any judge will laugh at you if you tell
> them: Well, we trust the million users we already have and the other 6
> billion who can sign on to OSM anonymously more than we trust the
> general public.
> I don't know what the right way of handling this is, but I do know that
> this isn't the right way. It isn't even a step in the right direction.
> It is a step towards making the project more closed and burying it in
> burocracy. You are ceding ground leading into a morass of legal details
> instead of arguing that this data needs to be public for everyone.
> Jochen
> --
> Jochen Topf  jochen at remote.org  https://www.jochentopf.com/
> +49-351-31778688
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