[OSM-talk] Why doesn't OSM implement a simple measure to protect it's users and passwords?
Frederik Ramm
frederik at remote.org
Sat Dec 26 10:44:57 GMT 2009
Hi,
John Smith wrote:
> I just thought of another situation, when sites don't protect users'
> privacy someone usually comes up with a firefox extension to protect
> their own privacy, in this case you'd generate noise by making a lot
> of fake requests for tiles in 2, 3, or even 10 other locations so that
> it's hard to determine real requests.
Do you now suggest that OSM should encrypt tile access, or do you
suggest OSM should ignore those people who are "willing to go to such
lengths to protect their privacy"?
I'm finding it increasingly hard to follow your logic.
My guess is that these people are unlikely to use OSM in the way you
describe because they would want to hide the fact that they even know
OSM. They'd much rather use anonymizing procies.
Bye
Frederik
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